Sunday 17 July 2022

ALLOW OUR PETITION--ADAMU MUHAMMAD ALKALI AND PEOPLES REDEMPTION PARTY (PRP) TELL TRIBUNAL IN JOS (READ UNEDITED FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS)

IN THE NATIONAL AND STATE HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY ELECTION PETITONS TRIBUNAL PLATEAU STATE

HOLDEN AT JOS

PETITION NO: EPT/PL/NA/01/2022

IN THE ELECTION TO THE OFFICE OF MEMBER, FEDERAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA FOR THE BASSA/JOS NORTH FEDERAL CONSTITUENCY, HELD ON THE 26TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2022.

BETWEEN:

  1. ADAMU MUHAMMAD ALKALI PETITIONERS
  2. PEOPLES REDEMPTION PARTY (PRP)

 AND

  1. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDP)
  2. MUSA AGAH AVIA RESPONDENTS
  3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL

COMMISSION (INEC)

THE PETITIONERS’ FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

1.0. INTRODUCTION:

RUBA (SAN) PRP COUNSEL

1.1.      This is the Petitioners’ Final Written Address in response to the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Final Written Address dated and filed on the 12th day of June, 2022.

2.0 STATEMENT OF FACTS

2.1.      The brief facts that prompted the filing of this petition are contained in paragraphs 1-13 of the Petition. We herein adopt and call upon the Honourable Tribunal to take judicial notice of same. After filing and exchanged of Pleadings by both parties in the Petition in accordance to law, pre- hearing session report was issued on the 23rd day of May, 2022, and hearing commenced in earnest on the 30th day of May, 2022, wherein the Petitioners called a total number of Seven (7) witnesses who all testified in the cause of the trial by adopting their respective Written Deposition on Oaths, identified and gave evidence in all documents made reference to in their depositions adopted before the Tribunal.

2.2.      In line with the pre hearing report the Petitioners  applied and tendered from the Bar the under listed  documents which were provisionally admitted and marked as Exhibits by the Tribunal, except the CTC of Judgments and ruling of High Court which were tendered through PW2 (admitted and marked as Exhibit P9 A-D; 

  1. The copy of the Subpoena issued in favor of ABC admitted and marked as Exhibit P1.
  2. The Certified True Copy of the BVAS Report admitted and marked as Exhibit P2.
  3. The CTC of forms EC8AII for Tudun Wada Kabong admitted and marked as ExhibitP3A & Voters register as Exhibit P3B 1-12.
  4. The CTC of form EC8AII for Bassa LGA as Exhibit P4(1-11) & Voters register as Exhibit P4B 1-4.
  5. The CTC of form EC8BII for both Ali kazaure as well as Tudun Wada Kabong admitted and marked as Exhibits P5A i & ii respectively.
  6. The CTC of forms EC8BII for Bassa L.G.A. admitted and marked as Exhibits P5B i – xii.
  7. The CTC of Form EC8C Local Government Results for Jos North and Bassa admitted and marked as Exhibits P6 A& B respectively.
  8. The CTC of Form EC8DII admitted and marked as Exhibit P7.
  9. The CTC of Form EC8E admitted and marked as Exhibit P8.
  10. The CTC of Courts Judgments Exhibits P9A-C (Judgments), and P9D (Ruling).

2.3.      While the 1st and 2nd Respondents on their part called a total number of Four (4) witnesses from the list of witnesses attached to their pleadings filed before the Tribunal tendered documents through PW6 i.e. the copies of Election results which were also provisionally  admitted and marked as Exhibits P10 i – xxvii.

2.4.      In line with the pre hearing report argument on all exhibits provisionally admitted shall be incorporated in the final written addresses of the parties.  At the close of evidence parties where ordered to file their respective final written addresses. Hence this final written address on behalf of the Petitioners.

  • ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

Having carefully scrutinized the evidence before this Honourable Tribunal, both oral and documentary, the Petitioners have crafted three issues for determination, founded on the three grounds of this Petition, to wit:

Having regards to Exhibit P9 (a), (b), (c) & (d), Section 65(2) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN), 1999 (As Amended)and Section 101(e) of the Electoral Act, 2022, whether the 2nd Respondent was at the time of the Bye-Election, qualified to contest for the office of Member, House of Representatives, Bassa/Jos North Federal Constituency which was held on the 26th day of the February, 2022. 

  1. Whether or not the Bye-Election for the office of Member, House of Representatives in Bassa/Jos North Federal Constituency held on the 26th February, 2022 can be said to have substantially complied with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022 and its accompanying legislations.
  • Whether the 1st and 2nd Respondents were duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the Bye-Election for the office of ember, House of Representatives in Bassa/Jos North Federal Constituency held on the 26th February, 2022.
  • LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND SUBMISSIONS:

4.1ISSUE I.

“Having regards to Exhibit P9 (a), (b), (c) & (d), Section 65(2) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN), 1999 (As Amended) and Section 101(e) of the Electoral Act, 2022, whether the 2nd Respondent was at the time of the Bye-Election, qualified to contest for the office of Member, House of Representatives, Bassa/Jos North Federal Constituency which was held on the 26th day of the February, 2022.” 

 

4.2.      The issue here is borne out of paragraph 17 of the Petition and is simply that the 2nd Respondent was at the time of the Bye- Election not qualified to contest for the office of Member, House of Representatives for Bassa/Jos Federal Constituency which was held on the         26th Day of February, 2022. The averments in relation to this grounds are in paragraphs 16a, b, c, d 17 I, II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, 24, 25,26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34 of the Petition, supported by the evidence of PW2 in paragraphs 3, 9, 10, 11 and 12. Under this ground, the 1st and 2nd Respondents did not respond to paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Petition, the pleadings stand uncontested and are thus deemed admitted. See ETENE V. NYONG (2012) LPELR-8031 (CA); KYARI V. ALKARI (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.222) 210.

4.3.      The 1st and 2nd Respondents rightly submitted in paragraph 4.3 of their Final Written Address that the question of whether or not a person is qualified to contest an election is within the meaning of Section 134(1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2022 can be determined exclusively by reference to constitutional requirements for qualification to contest, and the Petitioners’ grudges on this issue are wholly imbedded in Section 65(2)(b) of the CFRN which is to the effect that a person shall be qualified to contest if he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that party. By virtue of Section 65(2)(b) CFRN, the person vying for office of the House of Representatives must first and foremost be a member of a political party, and secondly must be sponsored by that party. By implication, such political party must have a structure and it is that party structure that sponsors a candidate for the election. In the instant case, the structure of the 1st Respondent was nullified by a Court of Competent Jurisdiction and it is upon this dismantled or non-existent structure that the 2nd Respondent claimed to have been sponsored to contest the bye-election. It is well settled that you cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse. See the case of MACFOY V. UNITED AFRICA (1961) 3 ALL E.R. 1169.

4.4.      Contrary to the contention of the 1st and 2nd Respondents in paragraph 4.4 that Exhibit P9 series has nothing to do with non-qualification of the 2nd Respondent to contest the bye-election, it is our humble, but firm submission that EXHIBIT P9 (a)-(d) pleaded in paragraph 16 of the Petition has direct effect or connection on nomination and sponsorship of the 2nd Respondent to contest the Bye-Election held on the 26th February, 2022. In this regard, it is pertinent to ask an important question: Whether EXHIBIT P9 series are valid and subsisting or set aside on Appeals? The answer is in the negative. EXHIBIT P9 series are documentary evidence and it is now firmly settled that documentary evidence is the best evidence and it cannot be altered or modified by oral evidence. See the case of AGBREH V. MIMRA (2008) 2N.W.L.R. (1017) 378 at 388, EMEJE V. POSITIVE (2010)1 N.W.L.R. (1174)48 AT 56 and SKYE BANK V. AKINPELU (2010) 42 N.S.C.Q.R. 540-541.

The Respondents did not deny the existence and binding effect of Exhibit P9 Series, though they have tried to feign ignorance of same through their witnesses. RW4 however admitted under cross-examination that he heard over the news that Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission (PLASIEC) refused or disallowed the 1st Respondent from participating in the Local Government Elections of Plateau State. But when confronted with Exhibit P9(b), he identified the parties as the 1st Respondent (Claimant) and PLASIEC (Defendant). In this regard, judgments are laws, and ignorance of the law reprieves or exculpates no one. It is elementary law that documents speak for themselves, and it is not in doubt that Exhibit P9 series are Judgments and Ruling of the Court which this Honourable Tribunal must take judicial notice of. However, we shall highlight the salient provisions or pronouncements in these Exhibits as it affects the candidature of the 2nd Respondent.

4.5.      In BITRUS B. KAZE & 11 ORS V. PDP & ORS (supra) (Exhibit P9(b) at page 46-48), the Court specifically directed the 1st Respondent (in the instant case) to take all necessary steps and actions to conduct elections for the PDP Executive Committee members for Plateau State in accordance with the CFRN and that of the 1st Respondent. And this democratically elected Executive Committee would then organize congresses for the purpose of electing delegates and subsequent nomination and sponsorship of candidates at elections. Rather than complying with this order, the 1st Respondent went and constituted another Care-taker Committee which proceeded with the Congresses and purportedly nominated the 2nd Respondent to contest the Bye-Election. My Lords, it is not in evidence that the 1st Respondent has complied with the said judgment even as it has failed or neglected to appeal against same.

4.6.      As follow-up to this development, the Court in ISHAYA ADAMU IZANG V. HON. MARKUS HESEINI NYAM (aka Kaunda) & ORS (Exhibit P9(a) at pages 3, 4 and 19) entered judgment for the Claimant against the Defendants and granted all the reliefs as sought, and of the greatest effect and relevance to the Petitioners’ cause are reliefs (b) and (f) which reads:

(b) AN ORDER OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT declaring that the PDP LGA Congresses elections held on the 23rd day of march, 2020 is in total disregard to Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, G, H and I renders the whole exercise invalid.

(f) AN ORDER OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT setting aside the purported PDP LGA congresses elections conducted on the 23rd day of March, 2020 by the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 8th Defendants, same having not being conducted in compliance with the relevant provisions of Exhibit A and B and in total disregard to ban on gathering exceeding fifty (50) persons.

4.7.      Upon receiving the Court’s Order, the Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission in obedience to same refused to accept all the candidates of the 1st Respondent for the Local Government Elections across the entire Plateau State, the 1st Respondent went to Court in PDP V. PLATEAU STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (PLASIEC) (Exhibit P9(c) at page 6-10 and 47), praying the Court to compel PLASIEC to accept and include candidates of the 1st Respondent (in the instant Petition) on the Local Government Election ballot. The Court delivered its judgment on the 29th day of September, 2021, dismissing the entire claim of the 1st Respondent for lacking in merit. Subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal met with the same fate, that is, dismissal for want of merit. See PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY V. PLATEAU STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION, APPEAL NO: CA/J/196/2021 delivered on 6th May 2022 where the Court held;

“…it goes without saying that the Appellant was in disobedience to the order of the High Court in Exhibit “H” which was/is subsisting as at the time of the action by the Appellant at the lower court.”

4.8.      Once more, the 1st Respondent went back to Court and prayed primarily for; “AN ORDER of this Honourable Court correcting the slip in Relief (f) in the judgment in SUIT NO.: PLD/J276CV/2020 delivered on the 24th day of June, 2021 by correcting the word “congresses” to read “congress” and by adding the phrase “in Jos East Local Government Area” immediately after the word congress.” The motive for this suit which turned out to be fruitless was an attempt by the 1st Respondent to exclude Bassa/Jos North from the blanket order that was made against all congresses of the 1st Respondent in Plateau State. In its Ruling contained in Exhibit P9 (d) and delivered two days before the day of the Bye-Election which is the subject of this Petition, the Court at page 14 dismissed the application for “lacking in basis and merit”. The 1st Respondent was fully aware that it had no candidate in the said election but proceeded on a futile voyage to present the 2nd Respondent for the election. The 3rd Respondent may have been derelict at its duty by allowing the 1st and 2nd Respondents to participate in the Bye-Election, but this Honourable Tribunal must rise to the occasion and protect the Courts by compelling obedience to Court Orders and meting out appropriate sanctions on willful and intentional contemnors such as the 1st and 2nd Respondents in this Petition. The Respondents disobeyed the Orders of the Court and must face the repercussion of their haughtiness. A decision or judgment of a Competent Court remains valid and effective until set aside by another Court of Competent Jurisdiction and all persons and authorities have the duty to enforce it. See ETENE V. NYONG (supra).

4.9.      It is trite law as was the decision of the EMEJE V. POSITIVE (2008) LPELR-4102(CA) that;

A document is the best evidence of its content…It is also trite that when a document is duly pleaded, tendered and admitted in evidence, the document becomes the best evidence of its content and therefore speaks for itself…that being the case, the court cannot disregard the document

4.10.    Let me quickly refer you My Lords to the case of KANU & ANOR V. OBETA & ORS (2015) LPELR-24432(CA) where the Court held on attitude of courts towards disobedience to Court Orders or judgments:

“Court Orders or Judgments are not permitted to be treated with arrogance and Order or Judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction subsists unless and until it is set aside and this of course is axiomatic. While it subsists, a person will be treading on perilous path who decides to arrogate to himself the right to ignore a valid and positive Order of Court. It makes no difference that ex facie it appears that the Court that made the Order is without jurisdiction. To therefore disobey an Order of Court under the misguided belief that the said Order is null for any reason whatsoever even if it subsequently turns out to be so in the end would be to Court active legal danger with all the unpleasant consequences that this may subsequently attract. The reason of course, is that until the said Order is finally determined to be null and void by another Court’s Order, the Order subsists.

The mere fact, as in the instant case that the matter had been transferred to another judge upon the strength of the petition of the Respondents does not mean that the matter as a whole no longer subsists in Court.

The option usually open to a person or persons to whom an Order of Court is made and who are dissatisfied or aggrieved have their remedies on Appeal against the said Order or simply apply to have the Order set aside as the case may be. See the case of   BABATUNDE vs. OLATUNJI (2000) 2 NWLR (646) 557 on the issue. See also the following cases on the subject.

  1. OSHIOMOLE vs. F.G.N. (2005) 1 NWLR (PT. 907) 414
  2. ODU vs. JOLAOSO (2005) 16 NWLR (PT. 950) 178
  3. GOV. LAGOS STATE vs. OJUKWU (1986) 1 NWLR (PT. 18) 621
  4. PLATINUM HABBEB BANK PLC vs. TARI (2008) LPELR- 4855 (CA.”

4.11.    In further reply to paragraph 4.5 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Final Written Address, the Petitioners predicated their case on Section 65(2),(b) of the Constitution and not Section 66. It is obvious that the reliance placed on Section 66 is not supportive of their case. A person may not suffer disqualification under Section 66 but may still not qualify to contest the House of Representatives Election if he falls short of the requirements under Section 65 of the Constitution. See the case of PDP V. KAWUWA (2015) LPELR-26044(CA). In the instant Petition, the 2nd Respondent was not sponsored by the 1st Respondent who at the time of the election had no capacity to sponsor a candidate, and this is goes to the root of the validity of the 2nd Respondent’s candidature. We urge this Honourable Tribunal to so find and to so hold.

4.12.    The 1st and 2nd Respondents also placed reliance on Section84(14) of the Electoral Act, 2022 as well as the case of APC V. INEC (2019) LPELR-48909(CA) in paragraphs 4.5 and 4.6 of their Final Written Address. It is obvious that the intention with due respect, is to mislead this Honourable Tribunal by maliciously substituting the phrase “selection and nomination” as is contained in the Act with “nomination and sponsorship” in paragraph 4.6 of the written address.Section 84(14) and the case of APC V. INEC has nothing to do with the requirement of sponsorship of a candidate under Section 65(2)(b) of the Constitution but rather on the question of selection and nomination of a candidate by a political party.

4.13.    It is our contention contrary to paragraph 4.7 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ Final Written Address, we refer Your Lordships to paragraphs 4.5 to 4.7 of the Petitioners’ Final Written Address and urge you to discountenance the submission.

4.14.    In response to paragraphs 4.8-4.15 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ written address, we call in aid a plethora of authorities to the effect that the question of qualification is both a pre-election and post-election matter. See ABDULLAHI A. & ANOR V. AHMED & ORS (2019) LPELR-49181(CA); APC V. NASCO & ORS (2019) LPELR-26049(CA); AUGUSTINE & ANOR V. YUSUF & ORS (2016) LPELR-26049(CA). It boils down to the question of who had the locus standi to sue and when his/her cause of action arose or became actionable, either before or after election. The CFRN being the Supreme Law has defined pre-election matters under Section 285(14) as follows:

(14) For the purpose of this section, “pre-election matter” means any suit by-

(a) an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of the Electoral Act or any Act of the National Assembly regulating the conduct of primaries of political parties and the provisions of the guidelines of a political party for conduct of party primaries has not been complied with by a political party in respect of the selection or nomination of candidates for an election;

(b) an aspirant challenging the actions, decisions or activities of the Independent National Electoral Commission in respect of his participation in an election or who complains that the provisions of the Electoral Act or any Act of the National Assembly regulating elections in Nigeria has not been complied with by the Independent national Electoral Commission in respect of the selection or nomination of candidates and participation in an election; and

(c) a political party challenging the actions, decisions or activities of the Independent National Electoral Commission disqualifying its candidate from participating in an election or a complaint that the provisions of the Electoral Act or any other applicable law has not been complied with by the Independent National Electoral Commission in respect of the nomination of candidates of political parties for an election, timetable for an election, registration of voters and other activities of the Commission in respect of preparation for an election.

4.15.    An Aspirantand a politicalparty at the primaries are the only persons that have the standing to sue for wrongs or illegalities prior to the general elections and any complaints outside those mentioned under Section 285(14) are not pre-election matters. Thus, any person or political party who may be subsequently affected by that wrong or illegality that took place in another political party prior to the election will have no option but to wait until the general election is held, and only if the erring candidate is not substituted by his party. This is only when the standing to sue would have accrued to such other persons or political parties. This is only when the cause of action would have become actionable by the candidates or parties other than that of the erring candidate. Thus, the Petitioners’ cause of action against the Respondents could not have arisen any time sooner than the 27th day of February, 2022 when the 1st and 2nd Respondents were declared as the purported winners of the Bye-Election, a clear demonstration that this is a post-election matter to be initiated within 21 days and not 14 days as it is with pre-election matters. See Section 285(5) & (9) of the CFRN. A person who is in willful contravention of the Electoral Act cannot be allowed to benefit from the illegality and neither can he be allowed to raise an objection of limitation of time under Section 285(9) of the Constitution to frustrate, stultify or impede an action challenging the illegality in Court or before any Tribunal. See NWOSU V. A.P.P (2020) 16 NWLR (PT.1749) S.C 28

The Apex Court in the case of NWOSU V. A.P.P (SUPRA) critically examined the provisions of the then Section 37 of the Electoral Act, 2010 vis-à-vis Section 285(9) of the Constitution (As Amended) to determine whether that instant appeal was statute-barred.

In the determination of the appeal, the Apex Court examined the maxim “Equity does not aid a party at fault”where AUGIE J.S.C in the leading Judgment at page 60 para E-H held that:

“It is a general rule that equity does not aid a party at fault, and this maxim has been variously expressed as follows;

  • No one is entitled to the aid of a court of equity when that aid has become necessary through his or her own fault:
  • Equity does not relive a person of the consequences of his or her own carelessness.
  • A court of equity will not assist a person in extricating himself or herself from the circumstances that he or she has created.
  • Equity will not grant relief from a self-created hardship.”

It is therefore our submission that a party shall not derive advantages from its own unlawful acts, as clearly captured in Exb. P9 (A-D)

4.16.    The law is trite, that any person who for legal restrictions did not have the opportunity to question the qualification of a candidate under Section 39(5) of the Electoral Act, 2022 at the High Court can still do so at the Tribunal under Section 134(1)(a) of the Act, the very first ground for questioning an election, and this is the Petitioners’ case. See the case of PDP V. INEC (2014) NWLR (Pt.1437) 525with regards to this submission.

4.17.    We also must add that the question of non-qualification of a candidate to contest an election is not an intra-party affair but a contravention of both the CFRN and the Electoral Act, and a party who is in contravention of the Constitution and/or the Electoral Act cannot contend that an Action is statute-barred, for the Court/Tribunal will not help a person who breaks the Law. The Supreme Court also held in the case of NWOSU V. APP (supra) that the Court cannot close its eyes to an illegality and “allow itself to be used as a tool to perpetuate an illegality, in whatever form or guise.” The 1st and 2nd Respondents must not be allowed to enjoy the fruits of a manifest illegality that began from utter disregard for the Orders of competent Courts. Where a candidate falls short of the constitutional provisions for qualification and disqualification, in this case under Sections 65 & 66 of the CFRN, he must be disqualified from contesting election and the question must be “exclusively determined within the purview of” those sections “and nothing can be added thereto”. See SAIDU V. ABUBAKAR (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt.1100) 201; PDP V. INEC (SUPRA).

4.18.    Also on the question of whether or not the issue of qualification is a pre-election or post-election matter, we crave your indulgence to reproduce the dictum of the Court of Appeal in the case of ABDULLAHI A. & ANOR V. AHMED & ORS (supra), where it eruditely held thus:

 

“…It is both a pre-election and post-election matter. If it is taken up as a pre-election matter, it must be a matter filed before the election. The fact that the election has come and gone does not detract from the matter being continued as a pre-election matter in regular Courts. Where however, the matter is taken up as a post-election matter, it can only be filed by a party to the election and it must be before an  election petition Tribunal under Section 138(1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). The position is well captured by the Supreme Court in the case of PDP V. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (pt. 1437) 525, where the Supreme Court held:

“Where a person who ought not to have contested an election was allowed to do so, the remedy available to a person seeking to challenge him at the Election Tribunal lies in Section 138(1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). In other words, a person who wishes to challenge the election on the basis that the winner was not qualified to contest the election has umbrage in Section 138(1)(a) of the Electoral Act. That is to say, where a person fails to take advantage of Section 31(5) and (6) of the Electoral Act in the High Court, he can still approach the Election Tribunal under Section 138(1)(a) thereof.”

This clearly justifies the contention of the Respondents and the position of the Tribunal that the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to entertain the matter. It follows invariably that the trial Tribunal was right to assume jurisdiction in this matter”

NOTE: The provision of Section 138(1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2010in the case above is now Section 134(1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2022 under which this Petitioners’ issue one, couched from ground one of the Petition is predicated.

4.19.    It is also the contention of the 1st and 2nd Respondents that the judgments and ruling in Exhibit P9 series “were delivered months and in some cases, years before the bye-election”, it is trite law however that judgment of a Court does not lose its efficacy and binding effect on account of its age. See the case of RTNA & ORS V. MHWUN & ORS (2008) LPELR-3196(SC) where the Supreme Court held that: “A case does not lose its value as a judicial precedent in common law system on the ground of age…But until it is overruled, it represents the state of the law. The older a case, the muturer it is, and this Court and all the Courts below are bound to follow it, and not throw it in the dust bin…

4.20.    We also reiterate our earlier submission that, the fact that the 3rd Respondent failed in its duty and included the 1st and 2nd Respondents on the ballot does not validate the impunity and outright breach of the constitutional requirement.

4.21.    The 1st and 2nd Respondents also relied heavily on the case of MBINA & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2017) LPELR-43248(CA) to submit that the jurisdiction of Election Tribunals does not “include the interpretation of judgments of courts of coordinate jurisdiction”. We submit respectfully that none of the reliefs sought by the Petitioners is seeking interpretation of Exhibit P9 series. The Petitioners are rather praying this Honourable Tribunal to give effect to orders of Court, which is that, the 1st Respondent had not structures to, and indeed did not sponsor the 2nd Respondent to contest the bye-election, and this failure to sponsor the 2nd Respondent renders him unqualified and in breach of Section 65(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 101(e) of the Electoral Act, and against which the Electoral Act under Section 134(1)(a) has given the Petitioners the audacity to approach this Honourable Tribunal for redress.A party who is in contravention of the Constitution and/or Electoral Act cannot content that an Action is statute-barred, for the Court/Tribunal will not help a person who breaks the law. The Court cannot close its eyes to an illegality and allow itself to be used as a tool to perpetuate an illegality, in whatever form or guise, and all persons and authorities have the duty to enforce Court judgments or orders. Please see NWOSU V APP (supra); ETENE V. NYONG (supra).

4.22.    The Court in that MBINA (supra), turned down the call to declare that there was a violation of the judgment or order of the Federal High Court in Suit NO: FHC/PH/CS/523/2016 between the PDP V. INEC & 2 ORS because the matter was already before the Court of Appeal. It held further that “It is not in dispute that the 3rd respondent has appealed challenging the judgment as per the notice of appeal in exhibit 2RA22 and exhibit 2RA21, motion for stay of execution; that being the case, where a party has filed an appeal against an order of Court, and cannot be proceeded against, for being in disobedience of the order…this clearly shows that the 1st respondent cannot be said to have acted illegally in performing its statutory duty…

 

 

4.23.    Be that as it may, the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ heavy reliance on MBINA (supra) is based on the misconception that the authority is still applicable. My Noble Lords, the decision in MBINA (supra)was reached prior to the 4th Alteration to the Constitution which was signed into law on the 7th day of June, 2018 by President Muhammadu Buhari, GCFR. Prior to the 4th Alteration, the Courts were developing the habit of declaring every act or event that took place before the election as a pre-election matter until the National Assembly in its wisdom, defined and confined pre-election matters to those provided under section 285(14) of the Constitution (reproduced supra) as well as specify persons with the standing to sue under that Section. Any issue or complaint that does not fall under that provision ceased to be a pre-election matter and any person not specifically mentioned therein does not have the locus standi to initiate a pre-election matter. The only question to ask at this juncture, and which answer is obvious is when the Petitioners’ cause of action against the Respondents arose or became actionable and from the totality of the evidence adduced, the cause of action against the respondent arose and became actionable from 27th February, 2022.

4.24.    Further on this question my Lords, in MBINA (supra), the party in breach of the order of the Court was INEC, an order against which it appealed and not the candidate at the election. In the instant case, it is the candidate and his party that disregarded the order of the Court which transmogrified into a breach of Section 65(2)(b) of the Constitution and which negatively affected the 2nd Respondent’s qualification to contest the bye-election. We urge Your Lordships to hold that the Court/Tribunal will not set the precedence of indulging politicians and political parties such as the 1st and 2nd Respondents to make caricature of its order by willy-nilly disregarding it and the same Court/Tribunal will bless their actions by allowing them to benefit from their obduracy. To do this will amount to a subtle invitation of anarchy unto and into our already fragile Country Nigeria.

4.25.    It is important to note that the Nigerian jurisprudence does not accommodate disobedience to court orders. In the recent case ofPEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY V. PLATEAU STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION(supra), the Court of Appeal sitting in Jos held as follows:

 

 

“From the record it is evident that the Appellant started its electoral process on a faulty ground by allowing the disbanded leadership to carry on the business of the party (exhibit 1 at page 160 of the record). By this conduct there was no legal foundation upon which the electoral process will stand. In other words, the whole electoral exercise being conducted by the Appellant was a nullity in view of the judgment of the High Court in Suit No: PLD/J304/2020. It is trite that nothing tangible can be placed upon nullity and it can stand. See MOBIL PRODUCTION (NIG) VS. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (PT.798) 1 AT 30-32; SALEH VS.MONGUNO (2006) 15 NWLR (PT. 1001) 26 AT 74 and OFIA VS.EJEM (2006) 11 NWLR (PT. 992) 652.”

In the light of the above position by the Court of appeal, we urge Your Lordship to agree with the learned Justices of the 2nd to the Apex Court that;

“That it is evident that the Appellant started its political process on a faulty ground by allowing the disbanded leadership to carry on the business of the party…”

And therefore, the Respondents shall not be allowed to benefit from their own fault, for fear of moral thought in politics that it’s better to defend than to be defendant.

4.26.    While we rely on our earlier submission at paragraph 4.14, we beg to add by asking the question ‘what on earth would have donated a cause of action to the Petitioners against the 1st and 2nd Respondents before the bye-election?’ The Petitioners would at best be labeled as busybodies and meddlesome interlopers any time before the primary elections and after the primaries, Section 285(14) has mentioned specifically what is and who can sue in a pre-election matter. We humbly urge Your Lordships to hold that the Petitioners only have the opportunity to vent their grievance against the Respondents in this Tribunal with the backing of Section 134(1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2022. See APC V. NASKO & ORS (2019) LPELR-49560(CA).

4.27.    We submit with respect my Lords, that the 1st and 2nd Respondents are blowing hot and cold at the same time by arguing that this Honourable Tribunal lacks the vires to interpret the judgment of another court of concurrent jurisdiction (even though that is not the case of the Petitioners), and at the same time are summoning this Tribunal and even the Petitioners’ witnesses to interpret the content of Exhibit P9 series particularly Exhibit P9D. See paragraphs 4.16-4.22 of their written address. The PW2 as the State Chairman of the 2nd Petitioner, paid for, obtained the CTC of Exhibits P9(A)-(D), identified and tendered same in open Court without objection. The Petitioners have placed these Exhibits before the Honourable tribunal to guide it in arriving at a just decision with the orders made therein in mind and against whom such orders were made, and from the evidence available to this Tribunal, there is no shred of it to the effect that the Petitioners have complied with the said orders or have appealed against same. The Petitioners have not called upon this Tribunal to investigate into why the orders were made but to simply give efficacy to orders of court as it is incumbent on any Court/Tribunal to protect the sanctity of the Courts especially by enforcing its orders at every given opportunity. See the case ofAPC & ORS V. KARFI & ORS (2015) LPELR-41857(CA).

4.28.    We submit that the 2nd Respondent was at the time of the Bye-Election not qualified to contest the Bye-Election against the Petitioners for falling short of the requirement under Section 65(2) (b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN), 1999 (as amended). A close look at the instant Petition, the Petitioners demonstrated that the 1st Respondent is a product of an ab initio nullified, voided or invalidated primary election, which effect is that, the 1st Respondent did not sponsor the 2nd Respondent to contest in the Bye-Election for the office of Member, House of Representatives for Bassa/Jos North Federal Constituency of Plateau State which was held on the 26th day of February, 2022. To be sponsored by a political party is a mandatory requirement that is provided for, both in the Constitution and the Electoral Act. Thus, it is our submission that the process that produced and purportedly sponsored the 2nd Respondent for the Bye-Election is void and or invalid by virtue of Exhibit P9 Series, his purported sponsorship also invalid; and to the extent of the 2nd Respondent’s invalid sponsorship, he is/was not qualified to contest, in this case, under Section 65(2)(b) CFRN and Section 101(e) of the Electoral Act, 2022.

4.29.    We submit further that it does not lie in the mouth of the 1st Respondent to claim due sponsorship of the 2nd Respondent to contest the Bye-Election, political parties must hold valid congresses/primary elections to be able to select and sponsor candidates for elections. Where this is done with nullified executives and delegates as is in the instant case, such Party is deemed to have sponsored no candidate in the election.

4.30.    It is submitted that the 1st Respondent ignored the judgment of the Court at the peril of not being capable of sponsoring any candidate in any elections inclusive of the Bye-Election for the office of Member, House of Representatives for Bassa/Jos North Federal Constituency of Plateau State which was held on the 26th day of February, 2022.

4.31.    The Court of Appeal interpreted Section 65(2) of the Constitution as to the requirement to contest election in the case of PDP & ANOR V. KAWUWA & ORS (2015) LPELR-26044(CA) thus:

“Now, by Section 65 (2) (b) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria as amended, it is provided as follows:

“65(2): A person shall be qualified for election under Subsection (1) of this section if:-

  1. He is a member of a Political party and is sponsored by that party.”

By the succinct provisions of Section 65 (2) (b), of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 as amended, it is unambiguously clear that in Nigeria there is yet no place for independent candidacy in our National Elections into the Senate and House of Representatives. It follows therefore, that a person can only be eligible and qualified to contest an election into the House of Representatives if and only if he is a member of a political party and “is sponsored by that party”.

Does the requirement of Section 65 (2) (b) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 as amended amount in law to a qualification for intending candidates for election into the House of Representatives in Nigeria? I think it does. This is so because the word “qualification” is defined to mean “the possession of qualities or properties (such as fitness or capacity) inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for a position or office or to perform a public duty or function”. See BlacksLaw Dictionary 8th Edition.

Interestingly, but very crucially, by Section 65 (2) (b) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 as amended , it is not enough that an intending candidate for election is a member of a Political party but most importantly he must in addition be sponsored not by just “a political party” but by “that political party” of which he is a member…”

4.32.    It is our humble submission that the 2nd Respondent was at the time of the Bye-Election, not qualified under Section 65(2)(b)and section 101(e) of the Electoral Act to contest the bye-election for the office of Member, House of Representatives for Bassa/Jos North federal Constituency of Plateau State which was held on the 26thday of February, 2022, and section 134(1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2022 has made this qualification the first ground to question an election. It would not matter whether the 2nd Respondent was/is not in breach of Section 66 CFRN or any other law.

4.33.    Now my Noble Lords, the law is trite that where the purported winner of any election is declared not qualified at the time of the election, the votes in his favour are null and void and are thrown away. The Court or Tribunal in such a case is bound to declare that the candidate for whom the next highest number of votes was cast has been duly elected.  See the cases of BAYO V. NJIDDA (2004) 8 NWLR (Pt.876) 544; EJIOGU V. IRONA (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt.1132) 513. In the instant Petition, the Petitioners scored the highest number of votes after the wasted votes allocated to the 1st and 2nd Respondents and must be declared duly elected in the Bye-Election to the office of member, House of Representatives, Bassa/Jos North Federal Constituency held on the 26th February, 2022.

4.34.    We urge Your Lordships to so hold and resolve this issue in favour of the Petitioners.

5.0.      ISSUE II.

“Whether or not the Bye-Election for the office of Member, House of Representatives in Bassa/Jos North Federal Constituency held on the 26th February, 2022 can be said to have substantially complied with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022 and its accompanying legislations.”

5.1.      On the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ submission in paragraph 5.1 of their Final Written Address, the Petitioners also adopt their arguments from their reply to the Respondents’ preliminary objection dated and filed on the 17th May, 2022. We reiterate however that addition of the word “substantial” to ground two did not expand the scope of the ground in favour of the Petitioners neither is it inconsistent with the Electoral Act and as such can pass as a good ground for questioning and election. DEEN & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2019) LPELR-49041(CA); USMAN & ANOR V. JIBRIN & ORS (2019) LPELR-48792(CA); PDP V. EL-SUDI & ORS (2015) LPELR-26036(CA).

5.2.      The burden on the Petitioners to prove this ground is first, that non-compliance took place, and secondly, that the non-compliance substantially affected the result of the election. See MOHAMMED & ANOR V. DANLADI & ORS (2019) LPELR-49138(CA). The Petitioners contend however, that it is only the 3rd Respondent that can adduce evidence against that of the Petitioners in proof that the bye-election was conducted in substantial compliance with the extant laws. May it please Your Lordships to so hold.

5.3.      My Lords, the bye-election of 26th February, 2022 did not substantially comply with Section 64(6),(7) &(8) of the Electoral Act, 2022 particularly where the Collation Officers of the 3rd Respondent refused to compare the result of accreditation on the BVAS with that on Form EC8A(II) even as the Supervisor/Collation Agents of the Petitioners repeatedly requested for it. We refer this Honourable Tribunal to paragraphs 41, 42, 44, 46, 54, 55, 57 of the Petitioners’ pleadings, paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 of the sworn statement of PW2, paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19 and 20 of the sworn statement of PW3, paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16 of the statement on oath of PW4 and paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14 of the statement on oath of PW7. We refer Your Lordships to Section 64(6),(7) & (8) of the Electoral Act, 2022.

5..4.     The law is now well settled, that where a statute stipulates a particular method of performing an act or duty regulated by that statute, that method and not any other method, must be followed. The Supreme Court in fact, emphasized this in the case of INAKOJU VS ADELEKE 2007 NWLR PT 1025 AT PAGE 590 where it was held as follows:

“Where the constitution or a statute provides for pre-condition for the doing of a thing or for the attainment of particular situation, the precondition must be fulfilled or satisfied before the particular situation will be said to have been attained or reached. The common and popular expression for it is condition precedent”

See also SYSTEM APPLICATION PRODUCTION (NIG) LTDS VS C.B.N (2004) 15 NWLR (PT 897) 655; ABUBAKAR VS A.G. FEDERATION 2002 3 NWLR (PT 1022) AT 643-644.

5.5.      The word “Shall” is key in the wording of section 64(6) of the Electoral Act, the procedure stated therein is mandatory. See the case of COL. KALIEL (RTD) VS ALH. ALIERO (1999) 4 N.W.L.R. (PT 597) PAGE 544.

5.6.      Agents of the 3rd Respondent consistently refused to accede to the request of PW2, PW3 and PW4 to compare the records on the BVAS and those on Form EC8A(II) before collating the results in accordance with the above reproduced provisions of the Electoral Act. How this refusal or failure to comply with this law has affected the Petitioners shall be considered later in this Address.

5.7.      Accreditation is a process of ascertaining that a voter’s name is in the Register of Voters in a particular polling unit where he/she registered to vote in an election. The Accreditation process shall comprise the verification and authentication of voters using the BVAS; cross-checking the voter’s name in the Register of Voters as well as inking of the cuticle of the specified finger. See page 23 of the Manual for Election Officials, 2022. Section 47(1),(2) & (3) of the Electoral Act provides that all intending voters must be accredited before voting using the BVAS, and where the BVAS fails to function, the election in that unit shall be cancelled. See also paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 23 of the Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Elections, 2022. It is the case of the Petitioners that, agents of the 3rd Respondent did not adequately utilize the BVAS in accreditation of intending voters in the polling units contained in paragraphs 46 and 52 of the Petitioners’ pleadings. Please see also paragraphs 14 & 15 of the sworn statement of PW2, paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12 & 13 of the sworn statement of PW3 and paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14 of the PW7’s statement on oath.

5.8.      Now, it is clear from Exhibit P2 that the record of accredited voters using the BVAS did not tally with the record of accreditation on Exhibits P3A, P4 in the polling units itemized under paragraphs 46 and 52 of the petitioners’ pleadings. My Lords, if only the BVAS was adequately used, the total number of votes in the polling units referred in paragraphs 46 and 52 of the Petitioners’ pleadings would not be at variance.

5.9.      The Petitioners also contend the cancellation of election results in Monido Street, AsibitinKutare and New market II, all from Ali Kazaure Registration Area without justification. This much is stated at paragraphs 63, 64, 65, 66, 67 & 68 of the Petitioners’ pleadings, paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14 of the statement on oath of PW5. Please see also Exhibit P5Ai. Even in the face of the Petitioners’ glaring accusation of the 3rd Respondent as to the unjustifiable cancellation of the results in the polling units listed above, the 3rd Respondent chose to not adduce any evidence to justify the cancellation, which implication is that, the Petitioners have satisfactorily established that fact is deemed sufficiently proved. The 3rdRespondent refused to enter its defence in order to clear up these misgivings or state the reasons for cancellation of the results in three polling units of Ali Kazaure Registration Area.

5.10.    We submit further that the 3rd Respondent declared and returned the 2nd Respondent as winner of the election in Exhibit P8 even before collation of results, noticeable by the date of collation and declaration. The law is that, election results must be collated before announcement/declaration. Please see 50 at 56 of the Manual for Election Officials, 2022. In Exhibit P8, it is evident that the election result was declared on the 26th February, 2022 while the result of Tudun Wada Kabong RA was collated at the Local Government Collation center as well as the Constituency Collation Center on the 27th February, 2022 as confirmed by the RW4 under cross-examination.

5.11.    My Lords, we urge you to hold that the Petitioners have demonstrated that the bye-election for the Bassa/Jos North Federal Constituency was not conducted in substantial compliance with the extant laws.

5.12.    It is our further contention that this non-compliance has substantially affected the outcome or result of the bye-election. We argue from the onset that if not for this non-compliance and its effect on the over-all result of the election, the Petitioners would have emerged winners of the bye-election.

5.13.    We begin with the 3rd Respondent’s refusal to adequately utilize the BVAS for accreditation. This is the position of the Petitioners in paragraphs 46 and 52 of the Petitioners’ pleadings and paragraphs 22, 23, 25 & 26 of the sworn statement of PW2, paragraphs 21 of the sworn statement of PW3 and paragraphs 14 & 15 of the PW7’s statement on oath.

5.14.    Other than the Petitioners’ witnesses, RW1 and RW2 were used under cross-examination to demonstrate how the difference in Exhibit P2 and P3A affected the Petitioners as it is highlighted at paragraph 73 of the Petitioners’ pleadings and paragraph 26 of the PW2 that if the result of the affected polling units were cancelled, the scores of the Petitioners will be 37,384 votes while that of the 1st and 2nd Respondents will be 25,896 votes as against the score of 37,757 votes and 40,343 votes for the Petitioners and the 1st& 2nd Respondents respectively.

 

5.15.    In other words, the number of votes in the 74 polling units against which the Petitioners predicate their concern are more than the number of accredited voters; a clear manifestation of over-voting. As at the time of the bye-election, the only authentic source of accreditation was the BVAS and where the BVAS failed to function, the election was to be postponed until it is replaced. See Clauses 19, 20 and 23 of the Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Elections, 2022. In INEC V. OTTI & ORS (2016) LPELR-40056(SC), the Court was of the opinion that:

“As I stated in SC.18/2016 that until section 49 of the Electoral Act is amended to bring in the process of electronic voting, the manual voters register will continue to play a prominent role in ascertaining whether there was over voting or not by its production and comparing it to the number of those accredited to vote and those who actually voted. It is only then that the information captured in smartcard reader can be used to establish the actual number of person who voted in the election”.Emphasis Ours.

5.16.    Going by the above cited authority and the introduction of Section 47 of the Electoral Act 2022, it is no longer necessary to rely on the voters register to prove over-voting. This can be done by simply comparing the record of accredited voters on the technological device (in this case, the BVAS) with the total number of votes cast at the polling unit in Form EC8A(II). It will also not require the presence of party agents in each and every polling unit to prove over-voting. In AREGBESOLA V. OYELOLA (2011) 9 NWLR (PT. 1253) AT 615 the Court held that “Adjudication in election cases would normally revolve around documentary evidence… It is part of the resolution of the election dispute to cancel unlawful credited votes in appropriate circumstances”. All documents relevant to the petitioners’ case are before this Honourable Tribunal and the Petitioners have demonstrated through the witnesses that there was over-voting particularly PW2, PW3, PW7, RW1& RW2. RW1 and RW2 specifically confirmed under cross-examination after comparing Exhibits P2 and P3A in selected polling units that there was over-voting, with the RW2 testifying to that effect in respect of his own polling unit where he voted. It is trite law that where there are admissions against interest, such admissions will be admissible against the person, such evidence shall be viewed in relation to the entire evidence before the Court. See the case of KAMALU & ORS V. DANIEL NWAKUDU UKAUMUNNA & ORS (1997) LPELR-1657(SC).

5.17.    The Supreme Court in the case of APC & ORS V. KARFI & ORS (2017) LPELR-47024(SC) held that “It is beyond doubt that over-voting is a serious electoral malpractice which should not be treated with levity. Any proven case of over-voting in an election should render such an election void…

5.18.    As we submitted supra, if the result of the affected polling units were cancelled, the scores of the Petitioners will be 37,384 votes while that of the 1st and 2nd Respondents will be 25,896 votes as against the score of 37,757 votes and 40,343 votes for the Petitioners and the 1st & 2nd Respondents respectively. This, my Lords, is the extent the result of the Bye-Election has been substantially affected by the refusal of the 3rd Respondent to adequately utilize the BVAS to accredit intending voters.

5.19.    On how cancellation of results in Monido Street, AsibitinKutare and New Market II has substantially affected the result of the bye-election, both Clause 39 of the Regulations and Section 51(3) of the Electoral Act reproduced above have made it mandatory that supplementary elections be conducted immediately where election is cancelled. It is evident from Exhibit P5Ai, P5Aii and P5Aiii as confirmed by RW3 that the number of registered voters in the three polling units are 966, 711 and 942 respectively, a combined figure that is substantial enough to affect, and has indeed affected the outcome of the Bye-Election.

5.20.    Also on this issue my Lords, the refusal of the 3rd Respondent’s agents to compare the records on the BVAS and that on Exhibit P3A even in the face of the repeated demands of the agents of the Petitioners contravened Section 64(6) of the Electoral Act. Had these agents complied and acceded to the requests the discrepancies would have been discovered and remedied under subsections (7) & (8) of Section 64 (supra).

5.21.    My Noble Lords, while the 3rd Respondent against whom this issue is directed chose not to adduce evidence in defence, the Petitioners, being unmindful of the requirement to succeed on the strength of their case, have demonstrated that the Bye-Election conducted by the 3rd Respondent on the 26th day of February, 2022 for Bassa/Jos North federal Constituency did not substantially comply with the Electoral Act, 2022, the Manual for Election Officials, 2022 and the Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Elections, 2022. The Petitioners have also shown that this non-compliance has substantially affected the result of the Bye-Election without which the Petitioners would have emerged winners of the election. May it please My Lords to so hold.

5.22.    The 1st and 2nd Respondents who chose to defend the case of the 3rd Respondent submitted at paragraph 5.2 of their written address that presumption of correctness or regularity inures in favour of the results declared by the 3rd Respondent. Submit that this presumption is rebuttable by displaying figures that were wrongly included or excluded from the results of the election. See the case of PDP & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2019) LPELR-48101(CA). We need not expend precious time and space but refer this Honourable Tribunal to Exhibits P2 and P3A which rebuts the presumption and establishes unmistakably that there was over-voting and the results cannot be said to reflect the true intention of the electorates.

5.23.    In reply to paragraphs 5.10-5.12 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the Petitioners contend that the 1st and 2nd Respondents misconceived the role of the Petitioners’ witnesses particularly PW2, PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW7. None of the Petitioners’ witnesses is a polling unit agent and they have given a detailed account of the various roles they played on the day of the bye-election in their respective statements on oath which include going round as many polling units as they possibly could inclusive of the 74 polling units in question, to observe proceedings which prompted the complaints of the Petitioners. In this circumstance they are eye witnesses and are competent to testify as to what they witnessed and can be cross-examined, were indeed cross-examined on same. The requirement for an eye witness is solely for the purpose of being capable to respond to questions under cross-examination to enthrone the right of fair hearing and no more. We urge your Lordships to so hold.

5.24.    Contrary to the contention of the 1st and 2nd Respondents in paragraph 5.13, it is evident that the subpoena upon which the PW1 attended and testified in this Petition is addressed to the Director, ICT Department of the 3rd Respondent and the PW1 in her sworn statement stated that she is a staff of the Department of ICT and thus capable of testifying for the Department being a public office. It is due to her competence to testify that the Respondents bombarded her with questions during cross-examination and she was able to respond to all even though she only attended and identified Exhibit P2 (tendered from the Bar) as having emanated from the office of the 3rd Respondent (her office). PW1 also need not be the author of the certificate of compliance with section 84 of the Evidence Act. Note that Exhibit P2 is a Certified True Copy and it has satisfied the requirement of the law, and having satisfied the pre-conditions under section 84(4) of the Evidence Act, no impediment in the Evidence Act would prevent the admission and utilization of the already identified documents in court. See the case of DICKSON V. SYLVA & ORS (2016) LPELR-41257(SC). We refer your Lordship further to the Supreme Court decision in the case of TABIK INVESTMENT LTD V. GUARANTY TRUST BANK PLC (2011) 6-7 S.C (PT. 111) 40, where it was held that where a public document has fulfilled the certification requirement for every public document, whosoever precures such a certified true copy of the public document is competent to tender such document in evidence in any proceeding in court without calling the public officer who has the custody of the public document, and we refers your Lordship to the provision of Section 146 (1) & (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011. We urge Your Lordships to discountenance the submissions of the 1st and 2nd Respondents for lacking in merit and basis on this point.

5.25.    In paragraphs 5.14, 5.15, 1.16, 5.19 & 20 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents written address, the 1st and 2nd Respondents made frantic efforts with a myriad of authorities to convince this Honourable Tribunal that the Petitioners must prove over-voting with the use of Voters Registers. We submit on this question that this argument is intended to unnecessarily over-labour this Honourable Tribunal. The record of the Tribunal would show that the Petitioners made desperate efforts including payment of huge sums of money to obtain the CTC of Voters Registers in just 74 polling units from the 3rd Respondent to no avail. Even the orders of this Honourable Tribunal to that effect returned fruitless. We at this point would pray your Lordships to invoke the presumption of with-holding evidence under Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act and hold that the documents if produced are unfavorable to the 3rd Respondent who withheld them and that the Petitioners have proved its case against the 3rd Respondent. See the case of NWOKE V. IWUAGWU (2005) 16 NWLR (PT.952) 543 where the failure of INEC to produce Form EC8A was held to operate against them. See also the case of PDP V. ALECHENU & ORS (2019) LPELR-49199(CA).

5.26.    Be that as it may, we are of the firm submission that the era of deciphering over-voting from Voters Registers and the results of elections is gone along with the Electoral Act, 2010. The Electoral Act, 2022 and its accompanying Manual, Regulations and Guidelines have ushered in a new dispensation which has made the electoral process easier as well as prosecution of election petitions. It is a notorious fact that until 24th February, 2022, the card-reader was not the only means of accreditation of intending voters. It thus made the Voters Register the only authentic source to determine the exact number of accredited voters to compare with the total number of votes cast in order to spot over-voting. It must also be said that the card-reader had no backing of the law and that is why the Supreme Court recommended that Section 49 of the Electoral Act, 2010 be amended to give legal support to the card-reader. See INEC V. OTTI & ORS (supra). The National Assembly, mindful of this recommendation/advice introduced in the mandatory use of card-reader or any other technological device for the purpose of accreditation and made it compulsory that the card-reader or such other technological device be the sole means of accrediting intending voters. The Electoral Act, 2022 with its accompanying legislations have made the technological device currently in use (BVAS) the only means of verifying, confirming and authenticating intending voters. See the Explanatory memorandum to the Electoral Act, 2022, Section 47 of the Act, Clauses 19, 20 and 23 of the Regulations and Guidelines, 2022 and paragraph 2.2 at page 23 of the Manual for Election Officials, 2022. The pertinent question at this juncture is: To what use or purpose will the Voters Register serve in deciding whether the total votes surpass the number of valid accredited voters which difference explains over-voting or lack of it?

5.27.    In this present dispensation, the era of electronic electoral process, the only means to discover over-voting is to compare the number of accredited voters on the BVAS with the total number of votes cast at that particular polling unit, and where the votes cast outnumber the accredited voters obtained from the BVAS, over-voting shall have been established.

5.28.    We must quickly add that the case of OKE V. MIMIKO (2014) 1 NWLR (PT.1388) 332 relied upon by the 1st and 2nd Respondents other than being inapplicable in the current dispensation, we submit that it was outrageous for the witness in that case to have testified in respect of the entire polling units in Ondo State. Also in that case, eye witnesses were required to prove allegation of corrupt practices which can hardly (if at all) be proved by documentary evidence. The Petitioners’ witnesses covered only part of the polling units in the Constituency, among which 74 are the subject of this Petition and they have been cross-examined in that regard. They are eye witnesses and we urge your Lordships to consider them as such. The Court cannot apply the same set of principles on cases having different factual situations. See IHESI V. ARINZE & ANOR (2006) LPELR-5461(CA).

The requirement is for an eye witness to testify, not necessarily a polling agent. It is a notorious fact that some political parties are less financially buoyant than others and cannot afford a polling agent in all the polling units and as such they improvise with the few at hand. Such political parties cannot be denied their right to petition any election on account of failure to station polling agents in all units while in possession of CTCs of all the documents needed in proof of the allegations. We refer your Lordships to the case of MARK V. CHUKWUEMEKA & ORS (2015) LPELR-40708(CA) where it was held that;

“The law is settled that when there is a dispute as to what took place or did not take place at the polling unit, the evidence of the polling agent or any other person who was present at the unit and who personally witnessed and saw the events there is vital. See BUHARI VS. OBASANJO (2005) 13 NWLR (PT. 941) PAGE 1, OMISORE VS. AREGBESOLA (SUPRA).”

5.29.    PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW7 have testified that they were present at the polling units under scrutiny and personally witnessed that there was no credible accreditation of voters, and this claim is corroborated by Exhibits P2 and P4A “The days of technicalities are gone. The current vogue is the doing of substantial justice to both sides in such a way that the main appeal will be heard and determined on the merit” Per MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, JSC  in OKE & ANOR V. MIMIKO & ORS (2013) LPELR-21368(SC).

5.30.    The 1st and 2nd Respondents at Paragraph 5.17 relied on the case of BELGORE V. AHMED (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 60 at 100 to argue that the maker of CTC of public documents must be called to testify. We submit with due respect that the 1st and 2nd Respondents misconstrued the import of that authority. The Supreme Court in that case also stated thus: “With respect to the volume of documentary evidence, I wish to state at the risk of repetition that they were merely tendered across the Bar by learned counsel for the petitioners at the trial. He did not and was, in fact, not in a position to answer questions or otherwise speak on any of them” This implies that, where there is any person other than the maker of a certified public document who is in a position to answer questions or speak on such document, the Court is bound to accept and act on the witness’ evidence. PW1 identified and answered questions on Exhibit P2 to the satisfaction of all the cross-examiners. Exhibit P2 is a combination of BVAS accreditation for the entire Bassa/Jos North Constituency which the learned counsel for the 3rd Respondent admitted in open court that he has no objection for its admissibility it originated from the 3rd Respondent, and we firmly submit that the PW1 being a staff from the ICT Department of the 3rd Respondent qualifies as a co-author of Exhibit P2. Exhibit P2 we submit, is electronically generated and all there is to its admissibility is to satisfy the pre-condition under Section 84(4) of the Evidence Act. The 1st and 2nd Respondents should not be heard crying foul or lack of fair hearing when they painstakingly cross-examined PW1 and she supplied the replies in proof that she is competent to testify in respect of Exhibit P2. Your Lordships are urged to so hold.

5.31.    PW6 also a staff of the 3rd Respondent identified Exhibits P3A, P3Bi-xii, P4Ai-xi, P4B1-4, P5A1-2, P5Bi-xii, P6A, P6B, P7 and P8 as having emanated from the office of the 3rd Respondents as the documents used for the Bye-Election on the 26th February, 2022, and was accordingly cross-examined. The sole purpose of the requirement that a document be tendered through its maker or any one that can speak about it is to accord the cross-examining party the right of fair hearing. Both PW1 and PW6 were in the position to speak on the documents they identified and connected with, and did answer questions put to them accordingly, and none of the Respondents have complained that his right to fair hearing has been breached by the mere fact that these witnesses testified. They have not shown how the testimonies of PW1 and PW6 have negatively impacted their right to a fair trial or how it is prejudicial to their cases and as such their submissions must be discountenanced.

5.32.    We submit further on this question that all the witnesses of the Petitioners testified that they were present at the time entries were made in the appropriate forms and even lodged complaints. PW2 witnessed the making of Exhibits P3A and P6A,PW3 witnessed the making of Exhibits P5A (Tudun Wada Kabong RA), PW4 witnessed the entries in Exhibits P6A(Jos North LG) and P7, PW5 witnessed the entries in Exhibit P5A (Ali Kazaure RA) and PW7 observed as entries were made in Exhibit P6A (Bassa LG). As for Exhibits P3Aand P4A, it is clear from evidence that the Petitioners’ witnesses were on the move from polling unit to polling unit and also observed first hand, the proceedings in those polling units.This evidence is not challenged by the Respondents and the Honourable Tribunal is bound to accept it as true. This satisfies the requirement of participation in the process of making the document as stated in the case of MIMI & ANOR V. SUSWAM & ORS (2019) LPELR-48780(CA). We urge your Lordships to hold that all Petitioners’ witnesses are competent witnesses in this trial.

5.33.    Assuming without conceding the position of the 1st and 2nd Respondents in paragraphs 5.21, 5.22, 5.23, 5.24 of theirFinal  Written Address, we shall say no more but rely entirely on the dictum of the Court of Appeal in AGAGU & ORS V. MIMIKO & ORS (2009) LPELR-21149(CA) thus:

“On the complaint of allegation of violence, rigging and other malpractice which the learned senior counsel said were criminal in nature, and which needed to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Petitioner who makes criminal allegation in an election petition but claims he won by majority of lawful votes in that election will still be entitled to his reliefs even when he fails to prove the criminal allegations beyond reasonable doubt, as long as he succeeds in proving civil allegation which amount to the non-compliance with the Electoral Act…The pleading of the greater certainly includes the less and if in proving the less, the case of the Plaintiff is proved, he could not and shall not be penalized for pleading the greater- see Arab Bank Ltd. V. Ross (1952) 2 QB 216 per Denning, LJ., at P.229 where he stated-

“Even with ordinary common sense, if I happen to find my coat with AB, and on a claim of recovery thereof, I alleged that AB stole the coat, the fact that I could not prove AB to be the thief does not deny me recovery of the coat once I establish the coat to be mine and not AB’s”.

One Chief Ajasin established he had the majority of the votes, the fact that he had failed to prove crime that went behind the scene, should not deprive him of his otherwise legitimately proved case. He has eminently proved his claim that Chief Akin Omobiorowo was at the time of the election not duly elected by a majority of the lawful votes cast at the election”.

5.34.    Contrary to paragraph 2.25 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, the Petitioners contend that the two requirements to prove non-compliance in election petition are that, there must be non-compliance, and same must substantially affect the outcome of the election. See the case of MOHAMMED & ANOR V. DANLADI & ORS (supra). It must not necessarily be widespread and it would not matter whether the non-compliance is from a single polling unit, it can vitiate an election as long as it substantially affected the outcome of that election. Non-compliance is said to substantially affect the outcome of an election where the margin of lead between the two leading candidates in an election is NOT in excess of the total number of voters registered in the polling units where the elections are not held or voided. See CHABO & ANOR V. ACHIR & ORS (2019) LPELR-48757(CA). The total number of registered voters from the 74 polling units under scrutiny probably outnumbered the difference between the purported winner and the Petitioners, a clear indication that the outcome of the election is substantially affected by non-compliance with the extant laws. We say ‘probably’ because the 3rd Respondent withheld the Voters Registers in order to thwart the efforts of the Petitioners in arriving at exact number of registered voters to prosecute this Petition.

5.35.    We urge your Lordships to so hold and resolve this issue in favour of the Petitioners.

6.0.      ISSUE III.

“Whether the 1st and 2nd Respondents were duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the Bye-Election for the office of Member, House of Representatives in Bassa/Jos North Federal Constituency held on the 26th February, 2022.”

6.1.      Under this issue, the Petitioner is required to plead two sets of figures: the scores announced by INEC and the scores he considers to be correct. ISREAL & ANOR V. AMOSUN & ORS (2019) LPELR-48916(CA), and in doing this, the Petitioner is obligated to tender in evidence all necessary documents by way of forms and other documents used at the election and to call witnesses to give evidence that the illegality or unlawfulness substantially affected the result of the election. See IWOWARI-GOLD & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2019) LPELR-49205(CA).

6.2.      The necessary documents in proof of this ground in the instant Petition and which are already in evidence include: (a) Exhibits P2, P3A, P4 SERIES, P5 SERIES, P6 SERIES, P7 and P8. Other than the Petitioners’ witnesses, RW1 and RW2 were used under cross-examination to demonstrate how the difference in Exhibit P2 and P3A affected the Petitioners as it is highlighted at paragraph 73 of the Petitioners’ pleadings and paragraph 26 of the PW2 that if the result of the affected polling units were cancelled, the scores of the Petitioners will be 37,384 votes while that of the 1st and 2nd Respondents will be 25,896 votes as against the score of 37,757 votes and 40,343 votes for the Petitioners and the 1st & 2nd Respondents respectively. We crave the indulgence of your Lordships to scrutinize the Exhibits before this Tribunal, particularly by comparing the figures from Exhibits P2 and P4A and hold that the votes that are in excess of 37,384 for the Petitioners and 25,896 for the 1st and 2nd Respondents are illegal, null and void for reason of over-voting are liable to be cancelled, in which case, the Petitioners will emerge winners of the Bye-Election held on the 26th day of February, 2022. May it please My Noble Lords.

6.3.      In answer to paragraphs 6.4, 6.5, 6.6 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ final address, we adopt our earlier submission that with the introduction of electronic technology in the electoral process, the Petitioners need not procure a legion of witnesses in proof of its case as long as the few witnesses speak to the documents tendered and are cross-examined on the documents. While we are not oblivious of the requirement for an eye witness to prove what transpired at the polling units, it is a settled principle in our legal jurisprudence that legal principles established in decided authorities are not to be applied across board and in all matters without regard to the facts and issues framed for adjudication in a particular case. See the case of MAI-KIRI V. YAHAYA (2018) LPELR-46595(CA) where it was held that “…each case is decided on its peculiar facts and circumstances, the decision in one case is not applicable to another unless the two are similar in respect of their material facts and circumstances…” We submit that a careful consideration of this Petition will establish that the Petitioners’ case can be satisfactorily proved via documentary evidence without more, and what is it words can say, to alter the content of a document? The Electoral Act, 2022 and its accompanying legislations having introduced and made mandatory the use of electronic electoral process, all judicial authorities in this regard that were based on the amended law are no longer applicable. The Electoral Act, 2022 has created an almost impossible mission to maliciously alter election documents since they are by law, sanctioned to be stored and transmitted electronically and are thus highly reliable once they emanate from proper custody. Who needs a million eye witnesses when a single document or two can conveniently, effortlessly and legally take their place in proof of an allegation? It must also be borne in mind that the Electoral Act, 2022 has given a specific and short period of time within which a Petitioner must open and close his case, which implication is that witnesses must be streamlined to the basics with more reliance placed on documentary proof. See paragraph 41(10) of the Rules of Procedure for Election Petitions in the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022.

6.4.      Adjudication in election cases would normally revolve around documentary evidence. See AREGBESOLA V. OYELOLA (supra). All documents relevant to the Petitioners’ case are before this Honourable Tribunal and the Petitioners have also demonstrated through the witnesses that there was over-voting, cancellation of votes, e.t.c., all of which can be proved with documents.

6.5.      In the course of their legal submissions on issue three, the 1st and 2nd Respondents from paragraph 6.7-6.50 raised objections as to the competency of the Petitioners’ witnesses to testify. We call the attention of your Lordships to note that these objections are limited to issue three and must be restricted to problems therein.

6.6.      We submit in opposition to paragraph 6.77, 6.8 and 6.9 that PW1 and PW6 are subpoenaed witnesses, a fact that is not unknown to the Tribunal who issued the subpoenas, that the statements of oath of subpoenaed witnesses must not be frontloaded within the time prescribed for filing of pleadings. In fact, statement of a subpoenaed witness may not even be filed at all but the witness will be allowed to either give evidence or tender a document as the case may be. See the case of AMACHREE & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2019) LPELR-48677(CA); See also the case of BASHIR & ANOR V. KURDULA V. ORS (2019) LPELR-48473(CA) where the Court was of the view that “…by making an application for a subpoena to issue to a witness, it shows that the Appellants who are desirous of proving  their cases or an aspect of it from the subpoenaed witness cannot ordinarily bring such witness in Court on their own…” and as such cannot be expected to obtain their written statements any time sooner than when the subpoena was issued. The Court continued thus: “The Tribunal, having refused the subpoenaed witnesses from testifying, having initially issued subpoenas for their testimony, cannot be said to have conducted the proceedings before it impartially and fairly…”

6.7.      In reply to paragraphs 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 6.12, 6.13, 6.14, 6.15, 6.16,6.17, 6.18, 6.19 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ written address, we submit that the witnesses identified themselves while on the stand and we refer your Lordships to our earlier submission on the competence of the Petitioners’ witnesses. This, with due respect is a desperate invocation of technicalities by the 1st and 2nd Respondents to usurp substantial justice. Technicalities my Lords, is the weapon of last resort in the arsenal of a Respondent who have no genuine and frank defence. It is the duty of this tribunal to steer-clear of any technicality and aim at doing substantial justice. See the case of VITACHEM (NIG) LTD V. DSM SINOCHEM PHARMACEUTICALS INDI PRIVATE LTD (2017) LPELR-(CA). Where it was held thus: “Gone are days where counsels can use technicalities to halt or stall a matter. The courts have consistently held that the attitude of the courts should be toward justice without undue adherence to technicalities”.

6.8.      On paragraphs 6.20, 6.21, 6.22, 6.23, 6.24, 6.25, 6.26, 6.27, 6.28, 6.29, 6.30, 6.31, 6.32 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ final address, the Petitioners contend that they have satisfactorily rebutted the presumption of regularity by demonstrating with both documentary and oral evidence that there was over-voting in 74 polling units. We reiterate our submission that the documents are proper before this Tribunal and we urge your Lordships to carefully scrutinize same and find in favour of the Petitioners.  As for paragraph 6.33, 6.35, 6.36, 6.37, 6.38, 6.39, 6.40, 6.41, 6.42, 6.43, 6.44, 6.45, 6.46, 6.47, 6.48, 6.49, we refer your Lordships to our earlier submissions of these questions that are merely repetitive.

6.9.      On the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ objections contained in paragraphs 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13 of their final address, we contend that the 1st and 2nd Respondents failed to demonstrate which documents tendered by the Petitioners that is not relevant to the Petition. Again, the 1st and 2nd Respondents submitted albeit, vaguely that Exhibit P2 did not emanate from proper custody. We submit on this point that there can be no custody more proper than the makers of the documents, that is, the 3rd Respondent whose staff (PW1) testified on subpoena and positively identified same. The 3rd Respondents itself had legal representation in Court but did not object as to proper custody of the said Exhibit, being mindful that it emanated from their office. On submissions regarding the other paragraphs, we refer this Honourable Tribunal to our earlier submissions which have succinctly elucidated and clarified these points raised by the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

6.10.    On the whole, we urge your Lordships to discountenance the entire submissions of the Respondents and uphold substantial justice by entering judgment for the Petitioners and granting all the reliefs sought.

6.11.    We accordingly urge my Lords to allow the Petition as prayed.

 

 

7.0 LIST OF AUTHORITIES

  1. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, 1999 (AS AMENDED)
  2. ELECTORAL ACT, 2022
  3. EVIDENCE ACT, 2011
  4. ETENE V. NYONG (2012) LPELR-8031 (CA); KYARI V. ALKARI (2001) 11 NWLR (PT.222) 210
  5. MACFOY V. UNITED AFRICA (1961) 3 ALL E.R. 1169
  6. AGBREH V. MIMRA (2008) 2N.W.L.R. (1017) 378 AT 388, EMEJE V. POSITIVE (2010)1 N.W.L.R. (1174)48 AT 56
  7. SKYE BANK V. AKINPELU (2010) 42 N.S.C.Q.R. 540-541
  8. BITRUS B. KAZE & 11 ORS V. PDP & ORS (SUPRA) (EXHIBIT P9(B) AT PAGE 46-48)
  9. ISHAYA ADAMU IZANG V. HON. MARKUS HESEINI NYAM (AKA KAUNDA)
  10. PDP V. PLATEAU STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION (PLASIEC)
  11. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY V. PLATEAU STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION
  12. ETENE V. NYONG (SUPRA).
  13. EMEJE V. POSITIVE (2008) LPELR-4102(CA)
  14. KANU & ANOR V. OBETA & ORS (2015) LPELR-24432(CA)
  15. BABATUNDE VS. OLATUNJI (2000) 2 NWLR (646) 557
  16. OSHIOMOLE VS. F.G.N. (2005) 1 NWLR (PT. 907) 41
  17. ODU VS. JOLAOSO (2005) 16 NWLR (PT. 950) 178
  18. PLATINUM HABBEB BANK PLC VS. TARI (2008) LPELR- 4855 (CA.”
  19. PDP V. KAWUWA (2015) LPELR-26044(CA)
  20. OF APC V. INEC (2019) LPELR-48909 (CA)
  21. ABDULLAHI A. & ANOR V. AHMED & ORS (2019) LPELR-49181(CA)
  22. APC V. NASCO & ORS (2019) LPELR-26049(CA)
  23. AUGUSTINE & ANOR V. YUSUF & ORS (2016) LPELR-26049(CA).
  24. NWOSU V. A.P.P (2020) 16 NWLR (PT.1749) 20, S.C
  25. PDP V. INEC (2014) NWLR (PT.1437) 525
  26. SAIDU V. ABUBAKAR (2008) 12 NWLR (PT.1100) 201; PDP V. INEC (SUPRA).
  27. OF RTNA & ORS V. MHWUN & ORS (2008) LPELR-3196(SC)
  28. MBINA & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2017) LPELR-43248(CA)
  29. MOBIL PRODUCTION (NIG) VS. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (PT.798) 1 AT 30-32
  30. SALEH VS. MONGUNO (2006) 15 NWLR (PT. 1001) 26 AT 74
  31. OFIA VS. EJEM (2006) 11 NWLR (PT. 992) 652.
  32. APC & ORS V. KARFI & ORS (2015) LPELR-41857(CA).
  33. BAYO V. NJIDDA (2004) 8 NWLR (PT.876) 544; EJIOGU V. IRONA (2009) 4 NWLR (PT.1132) 513
  34. DEEN & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2019) LPELR-49041(CA)
  35. USMAN & ANOR V. JIBRIN & ORS (2019) LPELR-48792(CA)
  36. PDP V. EL-SUDI & ORS (2015) LPELR-26036(CA).
  37. MANSOL V. H.E.S (NIG) LTD (2007) ALL F.W.L.R (PT 358) 1067 AT 1084 PARAS D-F (CA)
  38. DINGYADI V. WAMMAKO (2008) 17 NWLR (PT. 1116) AT 422
  39. AONDO V. BENUE LINKS (NIG) LTD (2019) LPELR-46876(CA)
  40. CPC V. INEC (2011) 18 NWLR (PT.1279) 493 AT 542;
  41. INEC V. OSHIOMOLE (2009) 4 NWLR (PT.1132) 607
  42. MAKON ENGR. & TECH. SERVICES & ANOR V. NWOKEDINKOR (2019) LPELR-49071(CA).
  43. MOHAMMED & ANOR V. DANLADI & ORS (2019) LPELR-49138(CA).
  44. INAKOJU VS ADELEKE 2007 NWLR PT 1025 AT PAGE 590
  45. SYSTEM APPLICATION PRODUCTION (NIG) LTDS VS C.B.N (2004) 15 NWLR (PT 897) 655
  46. ABUBAKAR VS A.G. FEDERATION 2002 3 NWLR (PT 1022) AT 643-644
  47. KALIEL (RTD) VS ALH. ALIERO (1999) 4 N.W.L.R. (PT 597) PAGE 544
  48. INEC V. OTTI & ORS (2016) LPELR-40056(SC)
  49. AREGBESOLA V. OYELOLA (2011) 9 NWLR (PT. 1253) AT 615
  50. KAMALU & ORS V. DANIEL NWAKUDU UKAUMUNNA & ORS (1997) LPELR-1657(SC).
  51. APC & ORS V. KARFI & ORS (2017) LPELR-47024(SC)
  52. PDP & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2019) LPELR-48101(CA)
  53. DICKSON V. SYLVA & ORS (2016) LPELR-41257(SC)
  54. TABIK INVESTMENT LTD V. GUARANTY TRUST BANK PLC (2011) 6-7 S.C (PT. 111) 40
  55. NWOKE V. IWUAGWU (2005) 16 NWLR (PT.952) 543
  56. PDP V. ALECHENU & ORS (2019) LPELR-49199(CA).
  57. OKE V. MIMIKO (2014) 1 NWLR (PT.1388) 332
  58. IHESI V. ARINZE & ANOR (2006) LPELR-5461(CA).
  59. MARK V. CHUKWUEMEKA & ORS (2015) LPELR-40708(CA)
  60. MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, JSC
  61. OKE & ANOR V. MIMIKO & ORS (2013) LPELR-21368(SC).
  62. BELGORE V. AHMED (2013) 8 NWLR (PT. 1355) 60 AT 100
  63. MIMI & ANOR V. SUSWAM & ORS (2019) LPELR-48780(CA)
  64. AGAGU & ORS V. MIMIKO & ORS (2009) LPELR-21149(CA)
  65. ARAB BANK LTD. V. ROSS (1952) 2 QB 216 PER DENNING, LJ.
  66. CHABO & ANOR V. ACHIR & ORS (2019) LPELR-48757(CA)
  67. ISREAL & ANOR V. AMOSUN & ORS (2019) LPELR-48916(CA)
  68. IWOWARI-GOLD & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2019) LPELR-49205(CA)
  69. MAI-KIRI V. YAHAYA (2018) LPELR-46595(CA)
  70. AMACHREE & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2019) LPELR-48677(CA)
  71. BASHIR & ANOR V. KURDULA V. ORS (2019) LPELR-48473(CA)
  72. VITACHEM (NIG) LTD V. DSM SINOCHEM PHARMACEUTICALS INDI PRIVATE LTD (2017) LPELR-(CA)

 

DATED THIS…………….DAY OF ……………………… 2022

 

____________________

Yakubu A.H. Ruba, SAN

IshaqMagaji, SAN

SIGNED BY:    M.S. Salihu Esq.,

A.S Umar, Esq.,

K.S. Adamu, Esq,

B.H. Suleiman, Esq.,

P.I.Mangs, Esq.,

I.E Dickson, Esq.,

M.A. Tsekaha, Esq.,

Fa’aziShehu, Esq.,

Dele Kashim, Esq.,

I.A.H Ruba Esq.,

S.L Umar, Esq.,

(Petitioners’ Counsel)

YakubuA.H.Ruba, SAN & Co.,

No. 61/33A Bauchi Road,

Jos, Plateau State.

08037040491

08163839999

mohammedsani30@gmail.com.

 

FOR SERVICE ON:

 

  1. 1ST AND 2ND RESPONDENT

E.G. Pwajok SAN, LB

With:

S.G. Odey, Esq.

  1. Oyawole, Esq.

C.I. Paul, Esq.

J.Y. Gwom, Esq.

M.G. Aluma, Esq.

C/o Sunny Gabriel Odey& Associates

Renaissance Chambers

No. 2 Wasa Close, Off D.B. Zang

Way, GRA, Jos, Plateau State.

08036812609, 08033477875

sgodeyonline@yahoo.com

  1. 3RD RESPONDENT

INEC STATE HEADQUARTERS

MIANGO ROAD, JOS.

 

 

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